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1 Introduction
The most visible reaction of policymakers to the
financial crisis was a focus on containment and
immediate protection. Yet alongside this, a second
focus has been on efforts at long-term protection,
including on how to restructure and to reform, so
that financial crises, which have arguably grown in
frequency and intensity over the past 40 years, can
be prevented or better contained and managed.
This second strand of policymaking involves
structural decisions in which seemingly technical
considerations about tools and mechanisms are
particularly closely tied to political institutions
and the nature of shifting global
interdependence and power. Here the new
circumstances have revived old agendas;
developing countries in particular have long been
concerned with the need to reform global
economic governance, notably the international
financial institutions (IFIs) and the G8 club
regime, if only to better reflect the fundamental
changes in the importance and interests of
developing countries in the last 50 years. Indeed,
in one notable shift, the crisis brought about the
high-profile outreach to the G20.1
This changed constitution of the focal leadership
aimed to reinforce the legitimacy of any new
arrangements. It also provides an important
starting point for thinking about the wider reform
of global (economic) governance: this article is a
contribution to this thought process. Our starting
point is potentially obvious: expanding
representation is not a panacea for more just or
more effective reform. Beyond this, and to shed
light on the dynamics of reform, we make a series
of interlinked arguments: (1) the crisis reflects
and propels geopolitical changes; (2) it is
interpreted differently by different actors;
(3) both factors are consequential for institutional
reform and the capacity for concerted action,
whether in the G20 setting or elsewhere.
The above arguments also provide the basic
structure of this article. The first section briefly
surveys shifts in power, both geopolitical and (with
respect to the G20) institutional. The second
section introduces the element of perception by
distinguishing different ways to ‘frame’ or
characterise the current crisis. It first outlines
these distinct frames and then reports on relevant
elite-level or media debates within selected
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members of the G20. The final section addresses
some of the implications for approaches to
structural reform by reviewing the results of the
London Summit of April 2009 (G20 2009). We
conclude with observations regarding future
challenges and the significance of summit-level
diplomacy.
2 What world are we in?
2.1 Geopolitics
At the time of writing, the crisis is still unfolding,
with experts continuously readjusting their
interpretations and estimates of both its trajectory
and speed (see IMF 2009; HM Treasury 2009). Yet
some things are clearer than others: originating in
the developed world it demonstrated a
fundamentally new quality of global
interdependence and interconnected
vulnerabilities across the globe. Its speed and
trajectory confirmed some pre-existing trends and
challenged others. Three points are especially
noteworthy: the limits to decoupling, uncertainties
about macroeconomic imbalances, and the return
of governments in economic relations.
The reach of global interdependence
The crisis debunked popular theories of ‘soft
decoupling,’ or the relative independence of
economic cycles in different parts of the world.
All were affected, and to often unexpected
degrees. Spread occurred for instance through
the prominent role of mobile or tradable
financial assets such as portfolio equity and
Foreign Direct Investment. Emerging markets
have proved extremely vulnerable through
financing gaps and the retreat of investment, but
also through the collapse of their export
markets. At the same time country-level effects
varied widely, depending on trade structure,
relative exposure of a country’s financial system,
dependence on flows of remittances or tourism,
size of private sector financing and its
investment profile, among others.
Macroeconomic imbalances
The crisis also revived long-standing concerns
about macroeconomic imbalances and the role of
the dollar as the international reserve currency.
In the short run, the dollar seemed to reassert
itself as the world’s reserve currency, leading to
large scale devaluations and concomitant
problems in much of the rest of the world.
However, doubts persist over its long-term
position. Indeed, the future US international
investment position is likely to be affected at the
same time as massive US government spending,
which will require ever more significant capital
inflows. Yet arguably, countries holding large
foreign reserves that pay low interest rates in a
currency likely to depreciate have large
incentives to diversify. China’s proposal for an
international reserve currency seems to respond
to such concerns. More generally, new debtors in
a world where government debt is rising will
have various and increasing degrees of power
over economic restructuring.
The role of governments
Paradoxically, while demonstrating the true scale
and impact of international economic
globalisation, the crisis seemingly reasserted the
role of governments and national economies. In
the developed world, this is evident in the role of
governments in international finance, be it
through direct nationalisation, more indirect
bail-outs or increased regulation. Post-crisis
banks now have ever closer links to governments;
and central banks are ready to increase their
responsibilities beyond price stability. At the
same time, the restructuring of financial
institutions is a matter of international politics
between governments. From Detroit to Paris,
governments moved to protect or restructure key
national industries, or reinforced each other
when calling for a clamp down on tax havens.
The shifting balance between private and public
money also affects the role of aid: with the
exception of sub-Saharan Africa, private capital
flows to the developing world had become a key
source of finance. These are likely to be radically
reduced, increasing the relative importance of
bilateral and multilateral Official Development
Assistance (ODA). So far, Chinese aid is unlikely
to decline with the financial crisis (Cook 2009), so
any diminishing Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) aid would
also reduce these countries’ influence or ability to
shape aid modalities. Multilateral ODA will
increase the role of IFIs, whose resources may
increasingly be leveraged through Asian Foreign
Exchange reserves. Finally, at the time of writing,
the decline in commodity prices suggests changing
room for manoeuvre for resource-rich countries,
including for instance Russia and Venezuela.
The above observations highlight that the
relative positions of current political actors are
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shifting. Where this is the case, discussions about
specific policies or measures are directly linked to
those relating to broader organisational reform.
Whether by functional or political logic, today
even short-term policies often depend on changes
in current institutional processes. For instance,
an increase in International Monetary Fund
(IMF) reserves is widely linked to changes in IMF
quotas. In slightly different ways, there is an
apparent link between the implementation of
domestic stimulus packages by national
governments and their enthusiasm for the closing
of tax havens and thus global, structural reforms.
2.2 From the G8 to the G20
The adjustment of global economic governance
to new realities and the response to the financial
crisis are thus intertwined. In early 2009, the
road to many if not all reforms seemed to pass by
the G20. The April London summit became the
effective focal point for policymakers and the
public. It was billed to forge global cooperation
on fiscal stimulus packages, chart a map for
effective global and national financial market
regulation and contain protectionism, as well as
forge consensus on reform of the IFIs and new
risk warning systems.
The, at least public, shift away from the G7/8
was maybe not surprising. Not only did it
symbolically spread responsibility, global realities
already undermined the G8’s role and its
perceived legitimacy. Recognition of this fact had
previously resulted in a ‘diffuse pattern of
outreach’ (Cooper 2007: 4) by the G8, as well as
proposals for other variously enlarged global fora
(see Evans 2007). The aim was variously to get
those at the table that really count to assure
legitimacy and effectiveness, but staying small
enough to reach agreement.
The G8’s combined economic strength was often
enough for a decisive influence on markets or
worldwide practice. Its power on most other
systemic issues rested in the capacity to exercise
leadership in competent fora or to provide
‘multilateral sponsorship’ (e.g. where consensus
forged during G8 deliberation sustained
initiatives within multilateral institutions where
they had dominant weight).
The G20 is based on the somewhat vague notion
of ‘systemic importance’, i.e. countries whose
problems can become problems for the ‘system’
as a whole. Thus, membership expansion has a
fundamentally stabilising purpose, despite its
ostensible narrative of change.2
Moreover, before the crisis, the G20’s role was
minor. Its members saw it as a forum for
informal and open dialogue contributing to
‘better global governance’. Yet they also believed
that G20 support for global initiatives had ‘only a
modest effect on members’ behaviour and even
less impact on the behaviour of non-member
countries’ (G20: 53). Moreover, enthusiasm for
the grouping was lacking for some emerging
countries, who at times preferred to secure their
status as representatives of the developing world,
to preserve their bargaining chips in future
multilateral or bilateral negotiations in other
ways, or who privileged other fora to connect to
the G7 (Birdsall 2009; Yongding 2005; Beeson
and Bell 2009).
If the G20 is to assume a major role and propel
substantial change (of whatever sort), its
authority will have to increase. Institutional
authority has many potential sources:
schematically, it can be based on (1) output and
the ability to propel change and (2) the
recognition of representativeness and, for global
mechanisms, adherence to the principles of their
constitution. Both of these factors depend in
good part on the ability to forge a shared
diagnosis (or a workable consensus) of the
problem at hand. This will both underpin
evaluation of the legitimacy of its membership as
well as the ability to agree on policy and policy
coordination. In recognition of this last point, the
next section analyses the substantially different
views of ‘the problem at hand’.
3 Crisis explanations and framing
3.1 Crisis frames
Official policy documents often refer to the
causes of the crisis as simply ‘complex’ and ‘the
culmination of years of economic and social
policy choices’ (e.g. IOSCO 2009: 6). Yet beyond
this, large differences exist as to whom the
blame is attributed to. Polled in early 2009, 72
per cent of Germans said that blame for the
crisis lay outside their own country, compared
with 39 per cent of British respondents and only
9 per cent of Americans. More interestingly
maybe, Americans blamed their political leaders
more than their bankers, with the British and
Germans attributing almost equal proportions of
IDS Bulletin Volume 40  Number 5  September 2009 91
blame to both (but Germany much less overall)
(Kellner 2009: 29–31).
Alongside geopolitical weight and the
measurable impact of the crisis, perceptions of
origin and blame arguably influence leaders’
views on reform and on participation and
positioning in global fora. Various competing
understandings or narratives of the crisis can be
distinguished (see also Weber 2008):
1 The crisis is due to regulatory failure and its
consequences in the main capitalist
economies. On the one hand, this explanation
highlights failures in domestic oversight of
mortgage markets, rating agencies and
banking supervision, notably with regard to
credit underwriting standards and
securitisation. On the other hand, it may also
include psychological models and attention to
internal incentive systems in the finance
sector, which are seen to have engendered
ever higher levels of internal risk taken by
individually rational employees aiming to
maximise their income. The latter approach
and framing is reflected in a number of
influential reports which provide analysis and
advice on how to adjust individual-level
incentives to provide macroeconomically
workable outcomes (McKinsey 2008; IOSCO
2009).
2 The crisis is a major manifestation of the
enduring ‘stability-instability paradox’ inherent in
capitalist markets (Minsky 1986, 1992).
Repeated and cyclical financial panics emerge
from periods of stability and optimism where
excessive risk taking becomes normalised,
eventually leading to instability and crisis, and
subsequent recovery. In this line of argument
for instance, the history of past ‘boom and
bust’ cycles includes instances ranging from
the tulip crisis in 1637, to the Great
Depression and through to the Asian Financial
Crisis and the dot-com bust. This view is
directly espoused in a recent working paper of
the Bank for International Settlements, which
states ‘the turmoil is best seen as a natural
result of a prolonged period of generalised and
aggressive risk-taking, which happened to have
the sub-prime market at its epicentre … it
represents the archetypal example of financial
instability with potentially serious
macroeconomic consequences that follows the
build-up of financial imbalances in good times’
(Borio 2008).
3 The crisis is an expression of ‘exploitative
hegemony’ in which the USA has acted as an
irresponsible great power. Because it can force
more of the costs of adjustment to shocks onto
others it consistently exploits its position
(Arrighi 2005). Some link this to the role and
causes of global macroeconomic imbalances:
‘Everyone agrees that it [the crisis] was
caused by over-borrowing by Americans who
were living beyond their means. But everyone
continues to lend to the US because they don’t
know where else to put their money. Of
course, the US is happy to keep on printing
money if there are willing takers’ (Rodrigues
2009). It is worth noting that the flipside of
this debate paints the USA as a consumer at
the mercy of Chinese (or Asian) trade and
investment policies.3
4 The crisis marks a deep and fundamental
catastrophe of Western financial capitalism, which
originates in a systemic failure that was a fatal
flaw in the US system, built on unquestioned
trust in the self-regulating market and
valuation of the profit motive. It was thus
inevitable and ultimately un-repairable. This
analysis positions itself at the most aggregate
level and is often attributed to established anti-
globalisation fora or radical economics. It found
an unlikely echo in the pronouncements by Alan
Greenspan in front of the House Government
Oversight and Reform Committee who linked
the financial crisis to a flaw in his ‘governing
ideology’, notably assumptions about the nature
of human behaviour in capitalist markets (New
York Times 2008).
Of course, countries rarely adopt single
narratives and neither do most individuals, at
least not exclusively, but even differential
adoption of their various ingredients informs
often starkly different options for institutional
responses. Different ‘takes’ on the crisis may be
thought of as policy ‘frames’ (Schon and Rein
1994), which contain a number of explicit and
implicit elements (Table 1), including:
1 A problem definition which contains information
about which type of data or information is
relevant and what information is to be relied
on in an at least partially uncertain situation.
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2 Definition of causal pathways which also
structure future expectations. A broad
example is the different answer to the
question on whether or not the post-crisis
world economy will differ fundamentally from
the pre-crisis one. The answer looks very
different if one adopted frames 4 and 2 above,
whereas in the cases of 1 and 3, it would
depend on the nature of regulation or
changing power relationships respectively.
3 Potential remedies. These provide the basis for
different policy positions or priorities. An
example may be the decision on prioritising a
review of (financial) sector-wide incentive
systems or the creation of a global reserve
currency. More broadly, the above frames
differ in putting the emphasis on technical or
political dynamics, as well as with regard to
the policy-level at which they should be
addressed and on how much intervention is
necessary.
4 A set of moral judgements. Linked to definitions
of causality and selections of who the relevant
actors are; frames attribute blame and thus
shape relationships.
3.2 Tracking national debates
‘Frames’ help to account for long-lasting
controversy even in the face of seemingly
undisputed raw data. In turn, aligning policy
proposals with more widely held frames provides
a way to achieve consensus (as when responses to
the crisis so far are widely perceived as a
repudiation of ‘free market discipline’).
Between October 2008 and February 2009, a
team of IDS researchers tracked such
underlying frames in national debates in
selected G20 countries: India, Japan, Indonesia,
Mexico, Brazil, South Africa and South Korea,
as well as following debates in Europe and the
USA. The methodological approach was
qualitative content analysis of web-based media
and information resources and, in some cases, a
limited number of target interviews with
journalists and policymakers. The guiding
questions involved the history of a given
country’s engagement with the G20/G8, the
nature of the domestic debate on the origins of
the crisis and who was to blame/seen to provide
the solution, with special attention paid to
international approaches to dealing with the
global financial crisis.
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Table 1 Narratives and frame components
Problem definition Causal pathways Remedies ‘Moral’ judgement
Regulatory failure Regulation (moral With right policies will Adjust individual Politicians to blame 
hazard/adverse return to previous system incentives. Financial for regulating wrong
selection) but with problem fixed sector organisational 
Human behaviour reform. National, if
(individual) necessary supranational 
level. (Technical fix)
Cyclical crisis Asset bubbles/lack of System will adjust itself. Wait out and buffer Nobody to blame
foresight Until next time worst effects. 
Human behaviour National level, via aid 
(group) (political decision)
Exploitative Power differentials To prevent recurrence, Rebalance (i.e. Global USA to blame
hegemony and egotistical USA must be reserve currency, 
behaviour (state) permanently weakened pursuit of decoupling 
as economic strategy).
National/regional
Crisis of capitalism Wrong values/norms System change, Alternative economic Principles of
Whole ‘system’ re-evaluation of growth organisation. ‘moral capitalism (or its 
model, profit motive capitalism’ All levels ‘variety’) to blame
(political)
For the purpose of exposition, this table does not integrate the considerable debate on ‘varieties of capitalism’, which
would be of relevance to a more fine-grained analysis (see Hall and Soskice 2001).
The general aim was to identify elite-level debates.
In contrast to government statements, they are
less likely to be influenced by the attempt to
send signals to nervous markets. Yet they neither
represent government positions or general public
opinion.
Based on frequency and source, researchers
forged qualitative judgement on the importance
of the different views expressed (the focus on
web-based media meant that national-level and
bigger/more widely distributed outlets were
privileged). Not unsurprisingly, elements of all of
the above narratives were variously expressed in
various national media, albeit unequally and only
the main themes are indicated below. At times
the specific nature of the media market in a
given country was taken into account. For
instance, in South Korea, researchers also
conducted a series of semi-structured phone-
interviews. However, it is important to underline
that these findings are indicative, not
representative and purely concern national
debate at the elite-level.
Further caveats include that during the exercise,
a drastic shift occurred in various countries away
from a view that they would remain relatively
unharmed, to a much more alarmed perspective.
This was particularly raised by researchers
working on Japan and Mexico. This and the often
wide range of views expressed within single
countries underlined that definitions and
explanations of the crisis were not yet fixed.
Data may also be affected by adjacent election
periods in Canada, South Africa and India as well
as the visit of US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton to South Korea (February 2009). The
next two sections present findings grouped into
two thematic sub-sections. The first pertains to
crisis explanations (causal pathways and
problem definition), the second focuses on
attitudes surrounding potential remedies or
institutional arrangements.
Explanations of the crisis
Not surprisingly, in countries without a home-
grown banking crisis, interdependence was seen
as a cause of the crisis. However, this occurred
both in the simple sense of behaviour ‘there’
affecting behaviour ‘here’, as well as in the
further sense in which the crisis itself was the
product of a specific form of interdependence or
relationship. The latter perspective was
sometimes framed in terms of a culture clash, an
‘unhealthy relationship’ between Asia and the
West (e.g. in India, South Korea, Indonesia).
Here, the term ‘unhealthy relationship’ is a
direct quote from the speech of L.K. Advani,
leader of the parliamentary opposition in India
and prime ministerial candidate of the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) who in the documented
speech went on to juxtapose the ‘excesses’ of the
western world to so-called ‘Asian frugality’
(Advani 2008). Such a theme, encapsulated in
notions of Western ‘greed’ and arrogance
emerged from reviews in other countries as well.
As such, the editor of the South Korean
Newspaper, Joong Ang Ilbo, referred to the fact
that the USA would have to abandon its
‘arrogant attitude’ and blamed the ‘invisible
hand of greed and deception’ (Kim Chong-hyuk
2008). In Indonesia this view also seemed
widespread with references being made to the
causes of the economic crisis in the ‘insatiable
pursuit of profit and greed by big market players,
lack of government regulations, and power-
thirsty and corrupt government bureaucrats in
the United States, Europe, Japan and other
capitalist countries’ (Guharoy 2008).
In Brazil, the report indicated a general
irresponsibility of western capitalist economies
functioning in an irresponsible way due to lack of
appropriate control and regulation of financial
agents (Moreira 2009). In Mexico, the
Archdiocese of Mexico declared in its weekly
newspaper that the crisis presented the failure of
‘savage, speculative capitalism’(La Botz 2009).
The issue of alleged Chinese currency
manipulation emerged as a topic of debate in the
USA following the remarks of the Secretary of
the Treasury, Timothy Geithner, on the subject,
and was also echoed in some editorials in the
UK. They did not appear in any of the other G20
countries. In China, where there has been little
public pronouncement, evidence gleaned from
informal conversations suggest that Chinese
experts and academics clearly put the blame on
American capitalism and spending habits.
In continental Europe, French President
Sarkozy’s speech in Paris in January was widely
noted for his attack on ‘immoral capitalism’
where he put the blame on financial speculators
in particular.4 The speech delivered by UK Prime
Minister, Gordon Brown, at St Paul’s Cathedral
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the day before the G20 summit also emphasised
the moral dimension of any sustainable capitalist
system (Brown 2009).
In contrast, in Canada the initial reaction
appears to have interpreted the crisis as a
foreseeable regulatory failure. Notably, Stephen
Harper during his election campaign said simply
that ‘a lot of things have gone wrong here and, by
the way, there were a lot of warning signs. This
should not be a huge surprise’ (Argitis 2008).
These competing views also relate to stances on
participation and positioning in global fora.
Many developing country experts seem to prefer
a global rather than a national approach to the
crisis (Coupé 2009). One global public opinion
survey seemingly indicated major support for
(unspecified) ‘fundamental changes’, both in
national and international economic systems (68
and 70 per cent, respectively) (BBC 2009). More
differentiated, the Eurobarometer surveys (2009)
indicate large variation among the EU members
states’ public.
In our tracking exercise, distrust in current high-
level processes seemed widespread. Again,
dominant themes are listed below.
From explanation to institutional arrangements
Researchers observed wariness of G20 symbolism
or other non-substantive incorporation in
international fora, which were however
considered important for information gathering.
In Japan, observers noted the relative lack of
concrete outcomes of the G20 summit in
Washington (Yamazaki 2008), but also indicated
its signalling factor both in terms of revealing
the declining role of the USA as well as
publicising a ‘clear conflict of interests between
the US and the EU’ (Makabe 2008).
In India, distrust of the reasons behind current
initiatives was articulated in this way: ‘A new
global structure is slowly and painfully falling
into place, not because of any voluntary reform,
some altruistic new vision, but for financial and
political survival’ (Guharoy 2008).
Research tracked much open and latent distrust
of the role of the IMF in any solution, linked to
seemingly widespread concerns that its ‘ideology’
has not changed (India, Japan, Indonesia,
Mexico). In South Africa, President Motlanthe
has publicly declared that reforms at the summit
to strengthen the IMF and the World Bank
would have to be accompanied by representation
for Africa in the international financial system.
The general media has been even more critical
(e.g. Diakanyo 2008).
Past experience of the Asian crisis was depicted
as a resource of technical knowledge and a
source of distrust. In Korea, the president’s
economic team was replaced to include those
with policy experience from the 1997–8 Asian
crisis (Economist Intelligence Unit 2009). In
Indonesia, researchers found resentment of
western institutions, notably the IMF, for the
treatment received during the Asian crisis of
1997–9.
Reports from Japan and China saw no return to
the pre-crisis status quo. In Japan, this linked to
the possibility and/or necessity to move away
from an export-based growth model (Makabe
2008). Indian sources also held the view that the
existing global order had run its course.5 On the
other hand, economic commentators pointed to
the lack of alternatives suggested by developing
countries ‘beyond suggesting higher IMF quotas’
(Anklesaria Aiyar 2009a,b) and voiced
considerable scepticism regarding real change:
‘most likely those who brought the global
economy to its current pass will masquerade as
its rescuers, and the interests of the creditors
will be protected by Washington’ (Guha 2008).
Wariness of G20 symbolism was expressed by a
number of interlocutors in South Korea. At the
extreme end it was seen as a mechanism to make
others share in the clean-up of the ‘mess’ created
by the G7. The view that the G20 itself was
mainly valued for the purpose of information
gathering or diplomatic reasons was expressed in
both India (Mattoo and Subramaniam 2008) and
South Africa (Draper 2008, 2009). On the other
hand, the recurrent emphasis on ‘seizing’ this
opportunity and shaping the agenda instead of
letting it be shaped by the G7 reflected more
ambivalence.6 A particular element was
unsurprisingly the willingness to use the G20 to
engage with new US leadership and reinforce
multilateralism more broadly. This was a
particular theme in Brazil (President Lula was
the 2008 chair of the G20), as well as in South
Korea and Indonesia, where it appeared linked
to the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton’s visit.
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In Indonesia, the G20 was notably presented as a
‘bridge’ (alongside the Chiang Mai Initiative and
the East Asia summit) through which Indonesia
could strengthen cooperation of the East Asian
region with the USA (Wanandi 2009).7 The
theme of regionalism was also apparent in Brazil,
where it linked to the government’s attention to
the Mercosur market as a regional base and the
concern to retain free trade within it.
An interesting element given the preceding
discussion was the insistence that Asian financial
reserves provide an important source of power
not easily traded off. As an article in the Jakarta
Post argued: ‘[Indonesia] needs to discourage its
other fellow members of the G20 from signing
up to a new global structure that the World
Bank’s Robert Zoellick is suddenly promising
with such enthusiasm, unless it has real checks
and balances. The collective bargaining power of
the G20’s $7 trillion in reserves should not be
wasted at this critical juncture’ (Jakarta Post,
30 September 2008). The related debate about
an eventual replacement of the dollar as the de
facto global currency with special drawing rights
had not begun during the time monitored by the
researchers, who did however record the public
awareness by Japanese commentators raising the
issue that the value of the dollar is ‘outstanding’
(e.g. Tsuda in Japan Mail Media 2008).
4 Implications
This article linked issues of institutional capacity
and reform to issues of policy framing. This was
based on the assumption that the purposes of
different institutional arrangements will be
shaped by different views on what needs fixing,
Does the above help make sense of what happened
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Box 1 London Summit outcomes
z IMF reinforced through increased resources and announcement of an enhanced future
role in the supervision of global macroeconomic policies. Most of the monetary
reinforcement was left unspecified or stemmed from previous pledges (Giles 2009). No
commitment to further changes to the quota system; instead already agreed-upon
governing reforms were pushed forward in time. In this sense, no change was made
which is likely to address the distrust of the institution which emerged from the frames
above.8
z Regional Multilateral Development Banks strengthened by pledges of $100 billion to be
raised from international capital markets. The World Bank received only pledge of
support through unspecified and ‘voluntary’ bilateral contributions.
z UN left empty-handed: ‘called upon’ to monitor the impact of the crisis on ‘the poorest
and most vulnerable’ (Final Communiqué, para. 25); the long-standing proposal of the
creation of a UN-based World Economic Council was revived by the German Chancellor
Angela Merkel but had no follow-up.
z Vague commitment to reviving the Doha round trade negotiations within the WTO
framework and an anti-protectionist statement (for a useful analysis, see Baldin 2009).
z Macroeconomic imbalances not directly/publicly addressed.9
z Details of future supervisory powers of IMF and enlarged Financial Stability Forum
(now Financial Stability Board) left to be defined, including precise nature of an early
warning system. Announcements were made with regard to future regulation of
systemically important hedge funds, recruitment and numeration practices, money
laundering and tax evasion.
z Efforts to deal with ‘toxic assets’ left to national governments.
z No further fiscal stimulus was agreed, due largely to French and German resistance.
at the London Summit and, more interestingly,
what happens now? Indeed, some of the themes
raised in our tracking were later echoed in official
country statements at the UN or the London
Summit itself (Muchhala 2009; Bretton Woods
Project 2009). However, policy positions are the
result of institutional and political dynamics where
geopolitical weight and domestic debates are only
two of many factors. Rather than using our
tracking exercise to predict country-positions or
specific outcomes at the summit, we therefore use
the information provided to reflect on its outcomes
and their future.
Looking at our data, it would be a surprise if
anything happened in London. Debates depict
not just large diversity, but also high degrees of
distrust and blame, albeit alongside some
opening, particularly with regard to the new US
leadership. The diversity of framing suggests that
any results would reflect hard bargaining or ‘soft’
symbolic politics rather than technical problem
solving (which problem needs solving, after all?).
What then, was the record of the summit? Most
concrete measures dealt with solving the crisis
and took the form of monetary announcements.
Most announcements involving future crisis
prevention and structural change took the form
of agreements to agree (on details in the future).
The results of the summit should not surprise:
(1) Structural change is highly difficult as actors
give away future power not punctual (one-off)
benefits. (2) Any outcomes were achieved in a
highly divided world, which, as the above
discussion shows, was probably more divided rather
than more united by the interdependence demonstrated
through the crisis. (3) Policy was debated in an
environment marked by high degrees of
uncertainty, both with regards to the dynamics of
the crisis and the preferences of the actors.10
Different frames make precise summit
agreements less likely, but they probably matter
even more for understanding the likelihood of
long-term implementation and regulation. They
unveil some of the sentiments behind the politics
of international summits and provide useful
hints for the practical future of their outcomes.
Important decisions are still outstanding; expert
fora are working at defining the detail of any
change, but uncertainty about data and causality
remains high. In this situation trust is a more
crucial and more scarce resource than normal,
arguably analogous to a necessary ‘credit-flow’ in
the system of international institution building.
Where does this particularly matter? For once,
future supervisory institutions charged with
identifying and isolating ‘systemic risk’ in global
financial markets (the IMF and the Financial
Stability Forum, FSF) will face the significant
problems of its ex ante identification. Given the
current inability to quantify or definitely assess
risk factors, supervisory institutions will need a
considerable degree of goodwill among
participating countries, so that not only first-
hand information is provided but any ultimately
proposed measures are actually implemented.
This analysis suggests at the very least, that
much continuous outreach and consensus-
building needs to be done.
What happens in the absence of consensus but in
the presence of relative independence? Scenarios
range from ‘global disengagement’, where
developing and developed countries alike
concentrate on domestic policy issues to the
detriment of any type of international cooperation
and may focus on import substitution, domestic
demand and raise protectionist barriers, to a new
focus on regional grouping and trading links or, as
a scenario, a wholly new reconfiguration, with
power shifting to newly engaged developing
nations (Rodrik 2009).
As noted, the promotion of less outward oriented
developing strategies was raised in Japan and
also, vocally, by the communist party in India.
The theme of regional concentration was also
evident in some cases (e.g. Indonesia and Brazil).
The European Union is arguably providing an
example for successful attempts to reach a
degree of regional regulation and response. If
not addressed globally, countries are addressing
the question of macroeconomic balances through
routing strategies, as China does with increasing
recourse to gold.11
In sum, the withdrawal from global arrangements
may be one of the biggest threats to success in a
collective crisis response, unless the variety of
different views are addressed head-on. Our
methodological approach, while largely suggestive
in this article, provides one possibility by which to
uncover the debates, openings and tensions behind
summits and beyond diplomatic agreements.
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Lastly, any pre-designed approach in which those
to blame for the crisis are seen as devising its
solution for others to implement, are unlikely to be
successful, adding onto a similar situation the
wider international community is already facing in
its efforts to combat and mitigate climate change.
Here, just expanding representation is not a
solution. Policymakers would be well advised to
track and understand the narratives of the G20
and wider groups of developing nations as well as
the institutional and political pathways by which
they influence reform options. Commitments
made at international summits are themselves
only one influence on ultimate policymaking,
which takes place on multiple levels and
frequently depends on domestic politics that
provide support and open channels of
implementation.
For policymakers, this points to the importance
of forms of interaction. These include formal
meetings and institutions but also the less visible
fora where trust and credibility can be restored
or established. Both are crucial to reach a
workable consensus.
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Notes
1 The G20 includes the G7 + European Union,
the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
China, India, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
South Africa, South Korea, Turkey and
Indonesia. It existed, since 1999, at the level
of finance ministers and only met at the level
of heads of state in November 2008. At the
London Summit, additional actors were
present, including the Netherlands, Spain,
representatives of NEPAD, ASEAN, the WTO,
the Financial Stability Forum and the UN
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.
2 Indeed, as documented in its own
(commissioned) history (G20 n.d.), the aim of
the initial G20 was to create the consensus for
Bretton Woods’ initiatives and provide support
for globalisation after the Asian crisis.
3 See the very different take of a recent
editorial in the Financial Times which instead
blames Asian savings for the resulting
troubles: ‘Countries with reserve currencies
and surpluses … have an exceptional
obligation … since they rely so heavily on the
spending and borrowing of others for their
own macroeconomic stability. China may be
beginning to understand this’ (Financial Times
2009). Gourinchas and Rey (2005) estimate
that a 10 per cent depreciation of the dollar
represents, all things equal, a transfer of 5 per
cent GDP from the rest of the world (quoted
in HM Treasury 2009).
4 More precisely, Sarkozy, speaking at the
symposium ‘New World, New Capitalism’ on 8
January 2008 blamed financial speculators for
having ‘perverted the logic of capitalism’.
5 For example Prakash Karat, General
Secretary of the Communist Party of India,
www.hindu.com/2008/12/15/stories/
2008121554201300.htm (15 December 2008
and 21 February 2009).
6 Interviews South Korea. Cho Yoon-Je,
professor of economics at the Graduate School
of International Studies, Sogang University
(Interview). Chosun Daily in-house columnist
Kim Ki-cheon.
7 Even though not tracked in the media reports,
it is noteworthy that in early March, South
Korea began formal talks with Australia and
New Zealand on bilateral free trade
agreements and made overtures to the ASEAN.
8 A commitment was renewed to base the
recruitment of heads of international
organisations on merit rather than on
nationality.
9 Indirectly, the introduction of IMF flexible
credit lines may reduce governments’
incentives to self-insure against instability by
accumulating foreign currency reserves. Also,
future increased global supervision by the
IMF may include relevant macroeconomic
policies.
10 A subsequent report by one of the agencies
charged with hammering out the details of
regulatory reform said what summit leaders
would never say: ‘Regulators are cognisant
that the causes and consequences of the crisis
are still unfolding, and it is perhaps too early
to formulate a concrete agenda of global
regulatory reform’ (IOSCO 2009).
11 Even though the Russian lending to Iceland
may not be highly significant, China
concluded a loan agreement with Brazil in
early March 2009 extending credit of US$1.5
billion to the Central Bank of over a period of
three years. This was followed by a currency
swap arrangement with Argentina in late
March 2009, unprecedented in the Latin
Hemisphere (Wang 2009).
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